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Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
19681 regulates the use of wiretapping and eavesdropping devices by
federal and state law enforcement agencies. Although the statutory
scheme broadly validates eavesdropping in criminal investigations,
2 it
establishes a judicial intermediary to safeguard constitutionally-pro-
tected rights from overzealous investigation. 3 The investigator is usually
required to obtain judicial permission to initiate eavesdropping,4 and
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (Supp. IV, 1969).
2 The Attorney General may authorize applications for eavesdropping warrants in the
investigation of Atomic Energy Act violations, espionage, sabotage, treason, riots, murder,
kidnapping, robbery, extortion, hijacking, interstate gambling and racketeering, presidential
assassination, counterfeiting, bankruptcy fraud, narcotics offenses, and conspiracy to com-
mit any of these offenses. Id. § 2516(1). State authorities have even more latitude, since
any crime "dangerous to life, limb, or property, and punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year" will support an eavesdropping warrant. Id. § 2516(2).
The Act has been criticized for being overbroad. Schwartz, The Legitimation of
Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MicH. L. REv. 455,
481-82 (1969).
3 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Supp. IV, 1969). The judicial intermediary was made a prerequisite
to eavesdropping by the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). The
Court felt that unsupervised eavesdropping constituted an unreasonable search and seizure
proscribed by the fourth amendment. Judicial control was designed to insulate the public
from unreasonable eavesdropping; the Court indicated that proper supervision should
approve only a single electronic intrusion to seize a specific conversation relating to a
particular crime immediately affecting the administration of justice. Id. at 54-58. By
intervening, the court was to remove all discretion to infringe upon fourth amendment
rights from the investigator. Id. at 59.
The Court further refined the rules for eavesdropping in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), by holding that under the fourth amendment each person carries with
him the right to privacy. Id. at 351-52.
It has been argued that Berger and Katz do not go far enough, and that eavesdropping
is per se unconstitutional. Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate:
The Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. Rzv. 169 (1969).
4 The warrant application must specify: the details of the offense (which may have
yet to occur); the location of the proposed eavesdrop; the type of communication to be
seized; the identities of the parties, if known; a statement of why alternative investigative
techniques are not feasible; and the proposed duration of the eavesdrop. Any warrant
issued states the place, time, and purpose of the eavesdrop and expires in 30 days. Ex-
tensions may be obtained by separate application and justification. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(l)-(5)
(Supp. IV, 1969).
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the investigation remains subject to the control of the court.5
In cases involving the national security, however, section 2511(3)
reserves to the President the power to authorize eavesdropping free
from any court supervision.6 If this national security eavesdropping is
"reasonable," its fruits are admissible.7 The obvious danger with such
5 After completion of the eavesdrop the court takes custody of all recordings. Persons
subject to eavesdropping do not receive prior notice, but they are to be notified within
90 days after initial application. However, upon a showing of good cause, even this
deferred notice may be postponed. Whether the parties subject to the eavesdropping
are notified of the content of the seized information is purely discretionary with the court.
Id. § 2518(8)(d). Evidence gathered is admissible (id. § 2517(3)), but if the warrant is
defective or the evidence is outside the scope of the warrant, it may be suppressed
(id. § 2518(10)). The government may appeal both the denial of a warrant and the
granting of a motion to suppress. Id.
It has been argued that the statutory safeguards do not comply with the Berger
criteria. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 461-66; Spritzer, supra note 3, at 176-77. Although
the Court has not directly reviewed the statutory provisions, it has referred approvingly to
some of Title III's eavesdropping safeguards. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 175 (1969).
6 Nothing contained in this chapter . . . shall limit the constitutional power
of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation
against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to
obtain foreign intelligence . . . essential to the security of the United States, or
to protect . . . against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything . . .
[so] limit . . . the constitutional power of the President to take such measures
. . . to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by
force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger
to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of . . . [the] com-
munication [intercepted under this subsection] ... may be received in evidence...
only where such interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (Supp. IV, 1969) (emphasis added).
This national security exception must be distinguished from another minor exception
to prior judicial approval. The statute permits retroactive judicial validation within 48
hours when an organized crime or national security emergency necessitated immediate
eavesdropping. Id. § 2518(7).
7 The term "reasonable" as used in § 2511(3) is ambiguous. It may be the President's
initial apprehension of a threat to the national security that must be reasonable, or it may
be that the use of eavesdropping must be reasonable. Nor does the statute indicate
whether reasonableness, however construed, is a question of law or of fact.
A further complicating factor is that "national security" itself is a term that has
defied congressional, executive, and judicial definition. Congressional enactments such as
the Subversive Activities Control Act are chiefly directed at a rather amorphous Communist
threat. The Subversive Activities Control Board, for example, is charged with monitoring
groups to determine the extent of control by foreign powers, their place in the "World
Communist Movement", the frequency of advocacy of typical Communist dogma, the
number of reports and visits by group members to foreign powers, and whether such
groups maintain secret membership lists. 50 U.S.C. §§ 792(e)-(f) (1964), as amended, 50
U.S.C. § 792(f) (Supp. IV, 1969). In the executive departments, the Attorney General
compiles a list of groups that are "totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or
[have] adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or
[Vol. ,56:161
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a broadly-worded power is that the government may use it to monitor
persons feared only because they advocate unpopular ideologies; indeed,
the Justice Department has admitted utilizing section 2511(3) powers
in the investigation of radical dissident groups.8 The freedom of as-
sociation--drawn from the cumulation of the express freedoms of reli-
gion, speech, press, petition, and assembly-has been recognized by the
Supreme Court to be a fundamental right fully protected by the first
amendment.9 Eavesdropping against associations destroys the privacy
that the Court has stated is a prerequisite of effective exercise of the
violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution.. . or [seek] to alter
the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means." Exec. Order No.
9835, 3 C.F.R. 627, 630 (1943-48 Comp.). See Note, The Bill of Attainder Clauses and
Legislative and Administrative Suppression of "Subversives," 67 CoLurr. L. REv. 1490
(1967). The Supreme Court has never tried to define what are legitimate concerns of
national security. See, e.g., Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 544 (1956).
The assumption seems to be that threats to the national security are either of Com-
munist or foreign origin. See, e.g., Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1961). Nowhere, however, is it clearly indicated
that the government may not perceive a threat to national security from a purely domestic
source. See Comment, The Right of Association and Subversive Organizations: In Quest
of a Concept, 11 VLL. L. Ra~v. 771, 782 n.62, 789 & n.118, 793 (1966).
8 The first indication 'of such use came in an announcement by Attorney General
Mitchell that he considered the national security eavesdropping power to be available
against radical domestic dissident groups. N.Y. Times, July 22, 1969, at 12, col. 1. Sub-
sequently, the FBI revealed it had used this power in an intensive national investigation
of the Black Panther Party. Id., Dec. 14, 1969, at 1, col. I. Eavesdropping on radicals
also played a prominent role in the recent "Chicago Seven" riot conspiracy trial. Id., Feb.
21, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
The legislative history of § 2511(3) makes it dear that domestic threats to the
national security were a primary concern of its proponents. Responding to an amendment
that would have limited extraordinary eavesdropping powers to organized crime investi-
gations, Senator McClellan, a key supporter of Title III, replied:
There is, for example, no relationship between organized crime and the
Atomic Energy Act, espionage, sabotage, or treason. There is no relation between
organized crime and riots. You could not bug a room or a hal in which Car-
michael was meeting, in which Rap Brown was meeting, where they were inciting
to riot, telling people to get their guns, "Go get whitey," and do this and do that.
Do you want to take that out of the bill?
114 CONG. Rec. 14702-03 (1968).
9 Explicit recognition of association as a fundamental first amendment freedom was
made in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958):
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly con-
troversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has
... recognized by remarking upon the dose nexus between the freedoms of speech
and assembly. . . .Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be
advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural
matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom
to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.
Id. at 460-61. For a sound analysis of the early association decisions, see Emerson, The
Freedom of Association and the Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964). Cf. Note,
Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE U.J. 842, 851 (1969).
1970]
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freedom of association."° If the free exercise of the right of association
can be impaired by the use of section 2511(3) powers, the section may
be in conflict with the first amendment."
I
THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF POTENTIAL EAVESDROPPING
ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
When the police power of government is exercised pursuant to
vague or overbroad legislation, so that citizens are in doubt as to what
activity is unlawful or otherwise subject to unfavorable official action,
those citizens may be deterred from pursuing legal or even constitu-
tionally-protected activities. When a vague or overbroad statute deters
the exercise of protected first amendment rights it is said to have a
"chilling effect" on those rights. 12
10 "Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be in-
dispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group
espouses dissident beliefs." NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
The association has standing to assert the first amendment rights of its members, on the
theory that the members have chosen the association as a vehicle to advocate their beliefs.
Id. at 458-59.
11 The Court has recognized that unrestrained use of investigative and police power
has a destructive effect upon the exercise of fundamental freedoms. Cramp v. Board of
Pub. Instr., 368 U.S. 278, 283 (1961); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51
(1957). The Court has also found infringement of the first amendment right of association
in various forms of state and federal action. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967)
(denial to Communist Party member of employment at defense facility); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (requirement of loyalty oath for teachers); Elfbrandt
v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (public employee loyalty oath requirements); Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 US. 500 (1964) (travel restrictions on Communist Party members);
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (teacher oath); NAACP v. Alabama ex tel. Flowers,
377 U.S. 288 (1964) (ouster of organization from the state); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Virginia ex -el. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (proscription of cooperative legal
activities); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (same); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instr.,
368 U.S. 278 (1961) (teacher oath); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293
(1961) (forced disclosure of membership lists); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
(teacher oath); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (forced disclosure of membership
lists); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (same).
Obviously § 2511(3) is open to attack on fourth amendment grounds in light of the
statement in the Berger majority opinion that all eavesdropping is subject to the re-
quirements of the fourth amendment. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62-64 (1967).
However, the section has not yet been tested, and a fourth amendment attack is not
necessarily available to all members of an association. The Court has held that fourth
amendment rights are personal and may not be vicariously asserted. Thus, one affected
by an eavesdrop cannot assert a fourth amendment violation if he was not directly sub.
jected to eavesdropping. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969); cf. Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
12 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1965); see Comment, Right of Asso-
[V/ol. 56:161
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The freedom of association is particularly vulnerable to "chilling":
the threat of unrestrained government action against a group may
occasion a decline in membership or financial contributions and even
loss of the community tolerance necessary for the group's effective
operation.1" Where government power to eavesdrop is virtually un-
checked, as it is in section 2511(3) national security cases, the slightest
unfavorable attention from the government toward an unpopular dis-
sident group may arouse among its membership a fear of eavesdropping.
The concomitant fear that the privacy of the group will be destroyed
may activate all the harmful effects of chilling.14
For many years, when confronted by an exercise of the police
power that conflicted with the freedom of association, the Supreme
Court resolved the conflict by "balancing" the respective interests.'6
If a statute was vague or overbroad, the Court often "rewrote" it,
construing it to conform to the first amendment.'0 In United States
elation Extended To Curtail Harassment of Political Associations Through Criminal
Investigations, 1969 UTAH L. Rlv. 883. See also Note, HUAC and the "Chilling Effect":
The Dombrowski Rationale Applied, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 679 (1967).
State action may exert a chilling effect indirectly; the passage of a vague or overbroad
statute may be sufficient in itself to discourage the exercise of constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court has been sensitive to indirect threats to first amendment guarantees. See
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 US.
589, 604 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, supra;
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964); Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 557 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 271 U.S. 415, 435-36
(1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960). See also Comment, Judicial Re-
writing of Overbroad Statutes: Protecting the Freedom of Association from Scales to
Robel, 57 CALir. L. Ray. 240 (1969).
18 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459-63 (1958). The destructive
effect of governmental action is magnified when an association is affected, because many
members may be denied not only the right to associate, but also the effective exercise of
express first amendment guarantees.
14 Eavesdropping under § 2511(3) occurs without notice. Thus, the chilling effect
results not from eavesdropping itself but from the likelihood that it will occur. The
likelihood is strong when a group undertakes activities or programs that create strong
governmental displeasure. See Note, supra note 12, at 679; cf. Brown v. Louisiana, 383
U.S. 131, 139 (1966); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963). See also Note, The Bill of Attainder Clauses and Legislative and Ad-
ministrative Suppression of "Subversives," 67 COLUm. L. Rv. 1490 (1967); Note, Riots and
the Fourth Amendment, 81 HARv. L. R1v. 625, 636 (1968).
15 E.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958). Balancing in
this type of situation was first used by the Court in American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U-S. 382, 393-404 (1950). See also Communist Party of the United States v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 88-105 (1961).
Balancing has been defined as the evaluation of two interests in irreconcilable con-
flict, with the total rejection of the one less favored. Note, supra note 12, at 704.
16 The Court read into one statute a "finding" that the Communist Party in the
United States has presumptively unlawful goals. American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.. 382, 593 (1950). Sections 2 and 3 of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387
1970]
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v. Robel,17 however, the Court indicated that when a statute is not
drawn with sufficient precision to avoid imposing a "substantial bur-
den" on freedom of association, balancing legitimate national security
interests against first amendment rights is inappropriate. 8 Thus, if
proposed governmental activity threatens to jeopardize associational
rights, Congress must find narrower means to accomplish its goals.19
Robel does not destroy the government's ability to investigate or
prosecute alleged criminal conspiracies; it merely forces the govern-
ment to concentrate solely on those aspects of concerted actions that
are unlawful. 20 Inasmuch as government has no interest in preventing
legal, much less constitutionally-protected, conduct, the Court has made
association a right that cannot be denied to anyone, even violent revo-
lutionaries. Forms of antisocial conduct pursued by dissidents may be
proscribed, but association per se must not be impaired by that pro-
scription and its enforcement.
2'
(1964), were judicially rewritten to include a requirement that advocates of violent over-
throw possess specific intent to bring about that result. Dennis v. United States, 341 US.
494, 502 (1951). In another Smith Act case, the Court held both that Congress could crimi-
nalize only certain qualitative degrees of membership in the Communist Party, and that
the membership clause of the statute (18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964)) actually incorporated these
rules. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 222-30 (1961).
17 389 US. 258 (1967). The case involved a prosecution under § 5(a)(1)(D) of the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (1964), which made it
unlawful for any Communist Party member to be employed at a defense installation
after a final registration order was entered against the Party.
18 389 US. at 264-68 & n.20.
19 It has been suggested that this case should be decided by "balancing" the
governmental interests ... against the First Amendment . . . . This we decline
to do. We recognize that both interests are substantial, but we deem it in-
appropriate for this Court to label one as being more important . . . . Faced
with a dear conflict between . . . the interests of national security and . . .
First Amendment rights, we have confined our analysis to whether Congress has
adopted a constitutional means in achieving its concededly legitimate legislative
goal. In making this determination we have found it necessary to measure the
validity of the means adopted by Congress against both the goal it has sought
to achieve and the specific prohibitions of the First Amendment. But we have
in no way "balanced" those respective interests. We have ruled only that the
Constitution requires that the conflict between congressional power and individual
rights be accommodated by legislation drawn more narrowly to avoid the conflict.
Id. at 268 n.20. Cf. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 -ARv. L. REV.
844 (1970).
20 389 US. at 267.
21 This dichotomy was recognized by the Court as early as 1937 when it held that
a criminal syndicalism statute could not proscribe a meeting of Communists, but could
proscribe actual illegal activity by the participants. Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 US. 353,
365 (1937). More recently, the Court held that even if a group as a whole espoused
illegal goals, government action should not adversely affect persons who were not knowing,
active members with specific intent to accomplish the group's unlawful objectives. Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 222-30 (1961). Subsequently, first amendment protections were
[Vol. 56:161
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Unsupervised eavesdropping power clearly has the potential to
deter the protected right of association by placing persons in fear that
the privacy of their associations will be invaded. No less than other
forms of State investigative or prosecutorial power, eavesdropping must
be narrowly confined by statute within limits that avoid conflict with
the unfettered exercise of civil liberties.22 The investigator must be
limited to electronic seizure of evidence of specific criminal conduct
and denied the discretion to monitor groups at random or in disregard
of the rights of those members pursuing lawful conduct. Even the most
radical association may harbor at once both criminal conspirators and
those without specific intent to participate in proscribed activity;23
eavesdropping is only tolerable when directly limited to the former.24
The remaining question is whether eavesdropping as permitted
by section 2511(3) is sufficiently narrow to avoid conflict with the first
amendment right of association. Section 2511(3) is the congressional
attempt to circumvent the fourth amendment standards of Berger v.
New York25 in national security eavesdropping cases. Robel,26 however,
granted even knowing, active members who lacked specific intent. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 884
US. 11, 12-19 (1966). In a later case, the Court explained the Elfbrandt rationale by pointing
out that, prior to Elfbrandt, a person accused of participating in illegal concerted action
had only three defenses: (1) that he was not a member of the group; (2) that the group
did not act illegally; or (3) that he was ignorant of the illicit activity. After Elfbrandt
he could also claim that he did not participate in the unlawful behavior. Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 US. 589, 608 (1967). Robel creates a presumption that within any
association there are members who do not share the group's goals. Thus, association with
conspirators does not in itself justify government action against the individual. 389 U.S.
at 266.
22 The test seems to be whether the statute or regulation is sufficiently clear on its
face so that the lawmaking power is not delegated by default to the investigator or
policeman. See Gregory v. Chicago, 894 U.S. 111, 120 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).
It is no excuse for a sweeping application of the law that the administrative burden
of isolating criminal activity is too great. Cf. Velvel, Protecting Civil Disobedience Under
the First Amendment, 87 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 464, 471 (1969).
23 The Court has squarely held that the goals of some members of an association, or
the association itself, may not be imputed to all members. Mfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S.
11, 17 (1966); cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 857 U.S. 449, 459 (1958).
The point is significant because the Court at one time had accepted a congressional
"finding" that all members of the Communist Party shared its per se illegal goals.
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 839 U.S. 882, 593 (1950).
24 Analogy can be made to the express first amendment freedoms which are abso-
lutely protected, but for which the protection does not extend to related conduct that the
state may proscribe. For example, the first amendment protects religious belief, but not
certain religious activity. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Speech is protected but not when it entails antisocial conduct.
Redrup v. New York, 886 U.S. 767 (1967); Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 854 U.S. 284
(1957); Feiner v. New York, 840 U.S. 815 (1951).
25 888 U.S. 41, 62-63 (1967).
26 889 U.S. at 264-68 & n.20, see notes 15-19 and accompanying text suPra.
1970]
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indicates that Congress cannot subvert the requirements of the first
amendment by any means or for any reason.
II
THE OVERBREADTH OF SECTION 2511(3)
Under section 2511(3), the preliminary decision of the investigator
to initiate eavesdropping is exempt from the requirement of neutral
judicial approval, and there is nothing to restrain the overzealous in-
vestigator. For protection against the threat of constitutionally-offensive
eavesdropping, associations must depend upon the self-imposed discre-
tion of the eavesdropper or upon ultimate review by a trial court of
the admissibility of evidence gathered by eavesdropping. At trial the
courts might utilize the reasonableness requirement of section 2511(3)
to force the government to justify the eavesdropping by describing the
specific unlawful conduct against which evidence was sought. Trial,
however, may come too late to prevent irreparable damage to the as-
sociation. 27 The statute neither authorizes nor forbids the blanket use
of eavesdropping against associations thought to menace national secu-
rity, and the definition of acts and situations dangerous to national
security is left substantially to the discretion of the executive. There
are no standards to guide even the conscientious investigator's conduct
toward associations.28 Therefore, section 2511(3) is offensive to the first
amendment because it is overbroad 29-it allows too great an intrusion
upon associational privacy. Only by invalidating section 2511(3) can
freedom of association be accorded the full protection guaranteed by
the Court in cases since NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.3 0
27 The Supreme Court has rejected the suggestion that the proper forum for vindi-
cation of rights is necessarily a criminal prosecution on the merits under the offending
statute, on the ground that, if such were the case, only the hardiest would dare exercise
their rights. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
28 Lack of standards to guide the investigator or prosecutor has been a determinative
factor in many first amendment cases, especially those involving association. See United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring); Dombrowski v. Pfister,
880 U.S. 479, 494 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 877 U.S. 860, 366 (1964); Cramp v. Board of
Pub. Instr., 368 U.S. 278, 286 (1961); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 854 U.S. 234, 253-54
(1957); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 810 U.S. 296, 808 (1940).
Lack of standards formed the basis for the eavesdropping rules under the fourth
amendment. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1967).
29 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 259-61, 265 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602-10 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 12-19 (1966);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 878 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v.
NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960).
0 857 U.S. 449 (1958).
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The alternatives to invalidation are not satisfactory. Perhaps the
courts could exclude evidence against associations81 gathered by eaves-
dropping under section 2511(3) where it is found that the investigator
did not limit the scope of eavesdropping to particular unlawful acts;
i.e., he acted unreasonably. This solution, however, is clearly inade-
quate. It is not certain that the exclusionary rule would be available
in a case not arising directly under the fourth amendment, and even
if the rule does apply, the exclusion would operate only after the
"chilling" damage had occurred. First amendment rights are not amen-
able to such uncertainty. The exclusionary rule deters only good faith
investigators; it would not affect an investigator merely gathering in-
formation on a group or harassing it without any intent to gather
evidence. Finally, the exclusionary rule in eavesdropping cases is only
available to those directly subject to the violation-those whose prem-
ises are intruded upon or whose conversations are overheard.
8 2
Since the issue of standing is not a problem in first amendment
81 The exclusionary rule normally operates to exclude evidence gathered in contra-
vention of the fourth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 883 (1914). The fruits of such evidence are also barred. Silverthorn Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 US. 885 (1920).
The current formulation of the exclusionary rule in eavesdropping cases requires
the prosecution to turn over to the defense all transcripts of conversations to which the
defendant was a party or that occurred on his premises. The judge is not permitted to
screen the transcripts at the government's request to restrict disclosure affecting the na-
tional security or third parties. If the exclusionary rule is operative, the prosecution's
sole alternatives are full disclosure or dismissal of the case. Alderman v. United States,
894 U.S. 165, 180-85 (1969).
32 In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), Alderman and Alderisio were
convicted of transmitting a murderous threat in interstate commerce. After the conviction,
it was revealed that Alderisio's business establishment had been subject to FBI eaves-
dropping during the period of the crime. While remanding the convictions to the district
court to determine if the evidence in the case was tainted under Berger and Katz,
the majority extensively reviewed the rules of standing under the fourth amendment:
The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amend-
ment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were
violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the intro-
duction of damaging evidence. Coconspirators and codefendants have been ac-
corded no special standing.
Id. at 171-72. Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1968); Goldstein v. United
States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). One challenging the legality of a search must show that his
own privacy was invaded. 394 U.S. at 178; see Jones v. United States, 862 U.S. 257, 261
(1960). The Court determined that the purpose of the exclusionary rule-deterrence of
unlawful searches-was amply accomplished by allowing the victim alone to raise the
defense. 394 U.S. at 174.
Thus, the only persons who can raise fourth amendment objections to eavesdropping
are those who are overheard and those who own the invaded premises. Id. at 179 &
n.11; cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 808 (1966). See also Mancusi v. DeForte,
892 U.S. 864, 867-70 (1968).
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cases, 33 judicial protection for persons who discover that they are sub-
ject, or likely to be subject, to eavesdropping may be available in the
form of declaratory or injunctive relief against the government. Dom-
browski v. Pfister 4 involved a Louisiana civil rights organization har-
assed by spurious and threatened state investigations and prosecutions.
The Supreme Court held that the group was entitled to pursue declar-
atory or injunctive relief3 5 rather than await defense of an inconclusive
series of prosecutions. 6 By analogy, a dissident group could seek relief
upon a showing of its reasons for fearing eavesdropping, the chilling
effect made operative by such fear, and the lack of any viable alter-
natives to such relief. Unless the government could disprove the eaves-
dropping or justify it, declaratory or injunctive relief should be avail-
able.37 Such an extension of Dombrowski, however, offers nothing
to groups that fear eavesdropping but cannot substantiate it. Invalida-
tion of section 2511(3) is the only certain resolution of the serious first
amendment conflict.
Stephen T. Owen
83 First amendment rights have been acknowledged by the Court as so critical that
one need not show that his rights have been directly invaded; it is enough that State
action has adversely affected the one seeking to raise the issue; e.g., by chilling. Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 US. 479, 486-87 (1965). Further, the association is permitted to
enforce the rights of its members. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
458-59 (1958). The distinction is made because the Court believes that although fourth
amendment rights can always be vindicated in court by the injured party, violations of
other rights may never reach the trial stage. Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953);
IElis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 799 & n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
34 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
35 The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964), permits a declaration of
the rights of parties in an actual controversy regardless of whether alternative relief is
available. Once declaratory relief is awarded, the court may consider "further necessary or
proper relief." Id. § 2202. Injunctive relief is also provided for by id. §§ 2282, 2284.
86 380 U.S. at 485-86. There would appear to be no significant distinction between
oppressive state conduct and oppressive federal conduct.
37 See Note, supra note 12, at 679; cf. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 253-55 (1967);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463-66 (1958); Comment, Right of
Association Extended to Curtail Harassment of Political Associations Through Criminal
Investigations, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 383, 389.
